426 Koenker consciousness in 1917 was becoming "declassed" as a result of the economic pressures and dislocations of the civil war. Menshevik leaders used this same fear to argue that since the social base of Bolshevik legitimacy had withered away, the Bolsheviks themselves should reconsider the assumptions on which they based their right to rule.3
Nikolai Bukharin spoke in March 1918 of the disintegration of the proletariat; Ian Rudzutak reported to the second All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions in January 1919: "We observe in a large number of industnal centers that the workers, thanks to the contraction of production in the factories, are being absorbed in the peasant ma-ss, and instead of a population of workers we are getting a half-peasant or sometimes a purely peasant population.'X4 And Lenin reiterated this theme at the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921: "People have run away from hunger; workers have simply abandoned their factories, they set up housekeeping in the countryside and have stopped being workers."5 Western scholars, too, citing the contemporary record, describe the ;'withering away of the proletariat." John Keep writes: "The menfwho made the October revolution, in so far as they were civilians and not soldiers, were soon dissipated to the four winds.... their place would eventually be filled by men who came straight from the village and were cast in a different mold."6
In this light, it becomes extremely important to examine the reality of this postulated decline of the working class and to ask how the demographic and social changes that took place between 1917 and 1921 affected the set of factors that had propelled the Bolshevik party to power in the first place.
It is one thing, however, to examine concrete indices of economic and social change, particularly demographic data, and quite another to link such changes to more elusive concepts that usually go under the name of ';revolutionary" or ;'class" consciousness. For example, it can be argued that there existed, among Bolshevik supporters in late 1917, a "revolutionary consciousness," a common sense of purpose and commitment to replacing the old regime with something new and more socially just. Some of the elements of this revolutionary consciousness have been
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identified in recent studies of the revolution and working class by S. A. Smith, David Mandel, and Rex Wade, among others.7 It was a consciousness shaped by short-term factors, most notably the specific eco^ . nomic and political experience of 1917, and by long-term factors as well. These include the ideology offMarxism itself, which fostered a tendency among workers to interpret their experience in terms of social class and class conflict. Another long-term factorwas the workplace and the relations it engendered: an autocrat-subject relationship between management and labor, and solidarity among workers who labored and suffered together in such close proximity. Still other factors have to do with social attributes of workers-education, skill, maleness, and youth which predisposed them first to develop a sense of politics and then to respond in a calculated, conscious manner, rather than in a visceral way, to the visions of revolution posed by the Marxist parties and by events leading up to 1917. Finally, the location of workers in cities also helped to shape revolutionary consciousness, in ways that will be detailed below. Suffice it here to say that urban working-class culture reflected several important attributes of the urban milieu, such as individual autonomy, utilization of a wide array of cultural and educational opportunities, and a social heterogeneity that enriched the perceptions and experience of urban residents.
All these factors helped to shape a specific kind of revolutionary consciousness pertinent to the specific conditions of 1917. It was a consciousness strongly influenced by ideas of class and of socialism. It does not follow, however, that these attitudes or this revolutionary consciousness was necessarily permanentand unchangeable. If some elements influencing this consciousness were changed, it is completely plausible that different attitudes might emerge. Kin, neighborhood, or possession of skill, for example, might be placed above class as the immediate source of a worker's identity. In such a case, the party whose popularity was based on its appeal to class interests, the Bolsheviks, might not command the same loyalty they had enjoyed under earlier conditions. Of course, conditions did change after 1917. Of the factors inlportant in shaping the consciousness of 1917, perhaps the only constant was Marxist ideology, which remained a powerful mediator of experience and whose appeal cannot be dismissed. But factory relations were dramatically transformed, the political and economic context of public life was also fundamentally different from wh.at it had been before the revolution, and the cities, instead of representing the attractions of modernity and culture, became after 1917 places from which to flee.
There were many signs, by early 1918, that the Bolshevik party did not command the same allegiance that had brought it to power. Although the Bolsheviks had not completely lost their mandate to rule, there were uncomfortable signs of an independent factory movement in Petrograd in early 1918 and a string of Menshevik successes in local Soviet elections in the summer of 1918.8 By 1921, amidst discontent and strikes among Petrograd workers, and a growing Workers' Opposition movement within the Communist party, sailors at the Kronstadt naval fortress rebelled, demanding Soviet reelections without Communist participation. The revolt was crushed by loyal Red Army troops, but the alienation it reflected prompted the party to search for a new economic policy to placate frustrated workers and peasants alike.
0
The party assessment of this debacle depended upon its interpretation of the social composition of its former supporters. The old Kronstadt revolutionary sailor had left the fortress, and his place was occupied by peasants and other unrevolutionary elements. The "trues' working class had been driven away from the cities by hunger? to be replaced, presumably, by new workers from cottage industry, agriculture, and whitecollar jobs eliminated by the revolution.9 (This was the same argument used to explain the Bolsheviks' lack of success among workers in the early months of 1917 that the cadres of conscious proletarians were diluted by nonproletarian elements.) In addition, Bolshevik ideology assumed that large factories were an essential cotnponent of proletarian consciousness; with the shrinking of the work force in these plants, with the decision by skilled workers to manufacture cigarette lighters that could be more easily exchanged for grain than machine tools, party officials believed that Russian workers were losing their class consciousness: this could only be restored by the resumption of production in largescale plants. l° The questions of support and of working-class consciousness are critical in interpreting this period and in understanding the sources of the Soviet political and social system, and they deserve a prominent place on the Russian Urbanization and Deurbanization 429 . . ............................................... .... S research agenda. This anicle will investigate just one aspect of changing social relations during the civil war, the problem of social composition in the former urban strongholds of the Bolshevik party. Given the obvious social dislocations indicated by the drastic decline of Russia's urban population, the question who stayed and who departed becomes important in identifying the nature of the available constituency for Soviet power during its early period of rule. In particular, this-article will address the question of the nature of the deurbanization of Russia and the relationship between this deurbanization, the "declassing" of the proletariat lamented by the Communist party, and the formation of a new and possibly different set of attitudes among workers-working-class consciousness-during these years. The social composition of Russian urban dwellers defies the strict definitions of census categories. Although urban growth was fueled largely by migration, the passage to the city was not one way, and an inhabitant did not acquire all the facility and characteristics of urban residence as soon as he or she passed the city barriers. The research of R. E. Johnson has shown that migrants themselves traveled back and forth many times during their years in the city; their families also tended to be distributed between city and village. It was not unusual for a working-class wife to bear her children in the city and then send them back to the country to live with relatives until they were old enough to work. Even more common, married male migrants lived and worked in the city while their wives and children remained home in the country.l4
URBANIZATION AND REVOLUTION
Such characteristics suggest that there existed a number of types of workers in Russian cities on the eve of revolution and that workers responded in different ways to the opportunities and pressures of 1917 and the years that followed. To clarify the following discussion, it is useful to rank these urban types in terms of a hypothetical "level of urbanization," in which "urbanization" is defined as the complete adoption of urban values, culture, and experi-ence: type A; most urbanized, parents permanent city residents, children born and raised in city; type B: parents in city, children move back and forth (consecutively as much as all together); type C: father in city, mother in country, children (especially boys) move back and forth; type D: father in city, mother and children in country; type E: sons and daughters come to city as first-generation migrants, parents remain in country. 
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Families of type A, however, were clearly in the minority, although growing in numbers; barely 10 percent of the Moscow working class in 1912 had been born in the city, although the percentage of workers whose parents had also been worliers (types A through D) was greater. For all of Moscow province in a 1908 study, about 40 percent of workers had parents who were workers, a figure that rose to 45 percent for workers aged fifteen to twenty-five years. 16 In assessing the impact of the urban crisis on urbanized workers after 1917, two questions arise. First, it is important to inquire whether and in what ways the city acted upon its inhabitants, especially those of the working class, to produce a particular cast of mind (oblik is the Russian term), a set of characteristics and values that can be labeled "urban working-class culture." The second question concerns the link between such culture and propensities to revolutionary activism.
Among the city's special contributions to the creation of a workingclass culture were the ways in which city life encouraged workers to act together, such as in food supply and dining cooperatives and in sick funds. The necessities of communal living developed the practice of cooperation, and of course, as the Marxists argued, the experience of working in large mechanized factories also taught cooperation. On the other hand, the diversity of the urban work force also provided opportunities for individual mobility and encouraged separatism as well as cooperation; typesetters, highly skilled urban workers, were notorious for setting themselves apart from other workers and often rfejected participation in a wider labor movement in favor of helping themselves.l7
In addition to these competing values of cooperation and individualism, the city offered its working-class residents cultural opportunities that in turn encouraged workers to value culture and education. Evening schools, public schools, neighborhood clubs and libraries, theater, and an active publishing industry offered workers a wide range of opportunities for self-improvement. Many workers used their reading ability to familiarize themselves with basic political issues, which were far more accessible in the cities than anywhere else, thanks to the concentration there of publishers and political activists.l8
Among the ways in which these urban values were transmitted, three deserve special mention. The first of these is family. The typology offered 
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The exemplary working-class neighborhoods of the two capital cities were Vyborg in Petrograd and Zamoskvorech'e in Moscow. Both districts were dominated occupationally by highly skilled metalworkers, but they also housed workers of other industries, especially women in textiles and food processing. The two districts shared a physical isolation from the upper-class and political culture of their cities, but were not so homogeneous that residents never came into contact with nonworkers or with workers of different social backgrounds. In 1917, both districts were far more politically active than other working-class neighborhoods of more homogeneous industrial composition.22
A third means by which the city fostered a special working-class culture was through the concentration of political power and activity. Newspapers ranging from government gazettes to sensationalist tabloids were printed in the cities, and they were read avidly by urban workers.23 The world of politics easily became the stuff of conversation in working-class neighborhoods, and urban workers had much better access to political information than workers scattered in provincial factory and mining towns. Furthermore, as political centers, both cities (although St. Petersburg more than Moscow) attracted opposition and underground activists. Socialists naturally sought to organize among workers, and their participation as evening-school teachers as well as professional political activists helped to give a socialist cast to ideas of political opposition. The city's particular advantage was to make available to workers a mixture of theory and a variety of experience that made a revolutionary socialist world view seem especially valid.
But how did this urban working-class culture contribute to the outcome of the two revolutions of 1917? It is indeed difficult to prove that workingclass supporters of Soviet power were somehow more "urban" in attitudes than those who supported other parties or none at all. Recent research by Heather Hogan, Victoria Bonnell, and others24 has demonstrated that organized workers those active in trade unions, factory committees, Soviets-tended to be urban, skilled, and predominantly male. Craft unions were especially successful in organizing in the first few weeks after February 1917, as they had been after 1905. of skill rather than urban experience may have been more important in facilitating such organization, the union ideology reflected values fostered by urban working-class life: socialism, collectivism, organization, and culture.25 It is also true that maleness was a more important factor in organization than urban experience per se; women did not organize themselves effectively either in 1917 or before, even though the proportion of urban-born women in the work force was generally higher than that of urban-born men.26 The contributions of urban women to the development of working-class culture, as wives, mothers, and workers, are largely uncharted, in part because they did not participate in the unions that provide much of the published record of working-class life before and during 1917, but their role deserves further study.
The future of the urban working class was represented by its youth, the children chiefly of families of type A and to a lesser extent of types B and C. These youths espoused urban and socialist values: education and culture, collectivism and comradeship, sobriety, sexual equality (apparently on a level higher than that of their parents), class pride, and solidarity.27 In 1917, working-class youth and others organized for the first time on a large scale; fragmentary biographical information suggests the leaders of their youth groups came from urban rather than from migrant families.28 By October, and even earlier, many working-class youth groups were enthusiastic if undisciplined supporters of the Bolshevik party. By contrast, young workers who had come recently from the countryside, as a young Moscow metalworker recalled, "were still weakly developed, and after the February revolution wavered among the Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, and Bolsheviks. The other and large part of the youthproducts of worker families already had experienced hard factory labor, had received the tempering of a worker. This worker youth after the February revolution very quickly organized around Bolshevik party cells, joined in protest meetings against the policies of the Provisional Government, fought for the eight-hour working day."29
Russian Urbanization and Deurbanization

435
Although youth organizations as such played only a supporting role in the actual seizure of power, the energy and commitment of youth were tapped by the revolution in other ways. Armed worker militias and Red Guards recruited members predominantly from among young and unmarried workers between the ages of seventeen and twenty-four.30 Moreover, Bolshevik party electoral candidates, in Moscow at any rate, tended to be substantially younger than those of the other two socialist parties. Alexander Rabinowitch also suggests indirectly that Petrograd Bolsheviks were attractive to and perhaps composed of young workers, particularly those under thirty years old. Although he does not dwell on the social composition of the party rank and file, he indicates that the Bolsheviks in Petrograd were a highly autonomous group of activist workers (a characteristic also of the Red Guards), who shaped the policy of the leadership, sometimes against Lenin's wishes.3l Their political independence and self-confidence reflected the advantages of urban culture: education and individualism, underscored by the strong sense of class separateness and consciousness that characterized the Bolshevik program in 1917. But although the revolutionary activists were dominated by skilled young male urban workers, more recent migrants svere also brought into the revolutionary arena in Moscow and Petrograd precisely because of their location in the urban centers: here the urban working class gave its special stamp to the revolutionary outlook of the nonurban elements it was able to mobilize.
The evidence is only circumstantial that young workers of urban families supported the radical Bolsheviks more than other parties, and that their radicalism was conditioned by prior attitudes shaped by urban life. But there is little evidence for the contrary argument that urban radicalism in 1917 was fueled by the rawest and least politically experienced elements of urban society. As for the Bolsheviks themselves, they had no doubts about the social composition of their supporters; they read the results of the elections to the Constituent Assembly in November 1917, Nhen they received 36.5 percent of the urban rote to 24 percent overall (and 47 percent in Petrograd and Moscow).32 And even though the army gave nearly half its votes to the Bolsheviks, the army would soon be demobilized. Thus their urban supporters were all-imponant, and the Bolshevik reaction to the urban depopulation following the-revolution suggests they feared that the loss of their urban proletarian cadres would seriously 
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occupation, length of time in that occupation, education, parents' occupation, and so forth. Most of these are unavailable, so it is necessary to estimate changes in social composition using age, sex, and occupational indices only.
Because occupational data were published only in the 1918 and 1920 census reports, it is difficult to determine who were the first 300,000 people to leave Moscow. The actual outflow did not begin until after May 1917, since a population count made for electoral purposes showed a slightly higher population in May than in February. By September, there were 195,000 fewer inhabitants in the city; about 163,000 of these were aged fifteen or over. Yet over the same period, the number of registered voters in the city adults over twenty-increased slightly. It is unlikely that fifteen-to nineteen-year-olds (of whom there were 250,000 in September)36 would have left in such disproportionate numbers. Therefore, the adults who had left by the autumn of 1917 may have been so marginal to the urban community that they had not bothered to participate in the electoral process in 1917. Most of those who departed were men (103,000 to 60,000 women); the evidence is suggestive that these were men and women most closely connected to the countryside, abandoning the city to make sure they would share in the expected redivision of land.
From September 1917 to April 1918, another 120,000 people left, 83,000 of them adults, 42,000 of them adult males. (Men and women over sixty did not participate in this exodus; their numbers actually increased from February 1917 to April 1918, a phenomenon that raises intriguing questions about the position of the aged in Russian society during this period.) By early 1918, Moscow had lost a considerable number of adults, especially adult males. Men left in the greatest numbers from the industrial suburbs to the east of the city center and from the southern Zamoskvorech'e. Some of these losses may have been due to relocation, as the city Soviet commandeered large private houses and reassigned them to workers' families.37 But the decline in the female population was uniform throughout the city, and this reaffirms the suggestion that the men who left the factory districts were the marginal and single men, those of type D, who had only recently come to the city from the countryside.38
Where exactly did the refugees go? Scattered evidence suggests that they returned to the countryside, both in the north and in the grain- 36 The published February census groups fifteen-to fifty-nine-year-olds, without further division. 42 The natural decrease in this period was 56,000, but since mortality statistics were not provided by sex, net out-migration must be calculated without regard to sex. In order to preserve the value of sex-ratio information, it is preferable here to refer to net loss of population rather than net out-migration. 43 See the worker families reported on in Kabo (n. 23 above). political and social consciousness of the Muscovite supporters of Soviet power. The children who left, on the other hand (especially some 100,000 teenagers), were now removed from a formative urban experience. But their absence, too, would little affect current political life in the city. If the city was "declassed," in other words, it was not because of the departure of women and children.
-'rO evaluate the impact of Moscow's depopulation on its political life, it is important to know which self-supporting individuals left the city. The net loss of 194,000 economically independent residents can be accounted for in table 2.
Among the largest groups of absentees were workers, domestic ser^ants, and proprietors. Workers will be examined in more detail below. Domestic servants were a rural class, cut off from city life and from one another; most worked as single maids of all work in middle-class households. were urban born (the city average was 29 percent). Among servants, there were sixteen self-supporting individuals for every one dependent, while the overall ratio was about two dependents to one independent (p. 74).
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in Moscow. Note also that 60,000 male employees left; their leaving was partially balanced by an influx of 24,000 women employees, primarily typists and other clerical personnel (messengers and couriers were classified as servants). Many of these office workers presumably worked for Soviet institutions, the biggest growth sector in Moscow, but others replaced departed or drafted men in business, factory, or cooperative society offices. Finally, an additional 80,000 residents in other categories came to the city, including 14,000 wards of the state (orphans, invalids, prisoners), and 50,000 people classified simply in "other occupations." Since these were almost all males, this large group of newcomers certainly represents the Moscow Red Army garrison. Many of these may not have been newcomers at all, but workers reassigned from Moscow factories to Moscow barracks.
Returning to the change among workers between 1918 and 1920, note that 90 percent of the decline is accounted for by men. Working women did not leave the city, unlike their economically dependent counterparts; from 90,000 in 1918, their numbers dropped only to 80,000 in 1920, whereas the number of male workers fell from 215,000 in 1918 to 124,000. In Petrograd, too, women dominated the labor force after 1918, especially in the age group fifteen to twenty-five.45 During the civil war, Moscow women continued to work in the same occupations they had held during the war and in 1917: textiles, clothing manufacture (especially army uniforms), and food and tobacco production.
Among men, skilled workers suffered the greatest numerical losses (although in percentages, these losses were less than among semiskilled or unskilled workers). It is this group that included the most committed of the revolutionary activists of 1917. 
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distinctions, a fact which was not part of the Bolshevik canon of revolutionary theory.
The changed social composition of the Moscow work force can be summarized by returning to the five types of urban workers described above. Urban type A workers had no place to go except the Red Army. Young men from this group may have disappeared during the civil war; their parents and sisters remained. Type D workers, husbands and fathers alone in the city without families, were the first to leave in search of land even before the serious crises began. Many workers of types B and C, whose attachment to the countryside depended on the length of the family's stay in the city and on the economic viability of their village property, may have chosen to stay in the city; young sons in these groups would also provide Red Army recruits. Finally, some young workers of type E, the first-generation migrants, may have also chosen to stay on, especially those who had begun to take advantage of city life. A number of Red Army veterans came from this stratum, and some recalled having attended evening schools while in the city.56 Workers of this type who were least assimilated would have returned home with the first wave of refugees in 1917, but social origin is an especially poor predictor of the outlook of such young unattached workers. Further research on the formation of the Soviet working class after 1921 would do well to observe the career paths of similar young workers who migrated from the countryside without the baggage of strong rural ties. It is likely that some of these type E workers would interact with and be assimilated into the urban core of the working class that had remained in the city.
DEURBANIZATION IN MOSCOW: CULTURAL CHANGES
The prevailing analysis of the "declassed" proletariat in 1920-21 by Mensheviks and Bolsheviks was based on two assumptions: one was the physical disappearance of former proletarians, and the other was the changing consciousness of the proletarians who remained. The demographic data for Moscow reveal that a sizable core of veteran urban proletarians remained in the city; they did not all disappear. Lenin assumed that a worker who manufactured cigarette lighters in his darkened former factory was less class conscious than his neighbor who used his skills to manufacture machine guns or locomotive parts. And while one may argue with Lenin's rather narrow definition of consciousness, there is no question that the dislocations of the civil war produced changing attitudes and caused workers to rearrange the priorities of their value systems. The question is, Were urban workers' values, their political consciousness, 56 Geroi grazhdanskoi voiny (Moscow, 1974). declassed or deurbanized? Did workers forget the class origins and class pride that had been so important in 1917? How did the dislocation of the civil war alter the specific elements that had contributed to the prevailing political consciousness as of October 1917?
Urban workers were especially likely to participate in political activity because of four factors: the educational and cultural opportunities afforded as part of an urban upbringing; the awareness of class interests fostered by ideology, employment patterns, and the settlement of workers in specific neighborhoods; the ease of organization for workers whose education and skills gave them resources with which to act; and the fact that the cities themselves were centers of political life.
The civil war exodus from Moscow affected som-e of these factors and not others. Education and culture continued, although at reduced levels. All children, regardless of social class, were given free noon meals, provided they attend city schools for an hour each day. delegate to Russia was told in 1920 (probably by Inessa Armand) that such people before the revolution preferred to live together without benefit of clergy rather than submit to the institution of the church; now, "as a rule, they prefer to be legally married.'66 Urbanized workers rather than peasants strongly preferred a secular culture; the rise in the civil marriage rate was thus surely facilitated by the fact that the women remaining in the city were relatively more urban than peasant as were the men. They were the children of type A and B families; and in marrying they were not only expressing hope in the future, but helping to perpetuate the elements of urban culture that had been evolving since well before the revolution. The families they would produce (slowly, because the number of births continued to fall during these years) would be purely urban, too. Consequently, this surge of marriages ( manufactured goods on the Sukharev market.70 Moreover, the class enemy was alive and well and fighting in the White Armies, as newspapers stressed throughout the period, although, despite the appeals for Sunday work to produce more arms and all-out drives such as "Front Week," this c.onfrontation was removed from the direct daily experience of most workers.
A second short-term factor in the Bolsheviks' success in 1917 had been their identification as a peace party. Once Russia had withdrawn from the international war, this appeal must have been diminished, too. Careful research in the varied periodical press of the period may help to determine how the populace felt about the civil war that their boys were mobilized to fight, but memoir sources give the strong impression that the civil war was perceived as a just and necessary conflict: Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, and nonparty citizens all volunteered to defend the social revolution.
The economic situation had unquestionably been a major critical factor in the formation of the particular class consciousness of 1917. Factories closed, workers were laid off, and the devastating supply crisis haunted the cities throughout 191-7. If the economic crisis was due to sabotage, as workers believed, then the socialists in the Provisional Government had been powerless to stop it. The Bolsheviks received a great deal of support precisely because they had not been implicated in the economic debacle of 1917.
But the economy continued to collapse in 1918, 1919, and 1920. Did the urban cadres of 1917 face the continuing crisis with the same sense of class consciousness that they had shared in October? Ralf Dahrendorf has argued that under varying conditions, class identity can lose its power as a focus of unity, and that other factors-workplace, neighborhood, skill, kin may become more important.7l The struggle for existence that workers in 1917 tried to solve as a class, through the Soviets, was not solved, and to survive, workers turned to other sources: individual trading and foraging for food, local institutions, workplace control. The result was that the Bolshevik party had to scramble politically to keep the backing of its former supporters. That no other organization arose to challenge them successfully may be ascribed in some measure to the utter lack of resources that workers had for any new mobilization of their 
